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This Symposium focuses in part on the ideas of Margaret Jane Radin as a point of
departure for the various contributions. A key part of the analysis includes the
process she calls propertization in the context of intellectual property rules and the
Internet. The approach taken in this introductory essay is twofold. The first part
presents some key points raised by the Symposium contributors. Of course, that
overview is necessarily incomplete, because the contributions represent a rich group
of analyses about vital concerns relating to how our legal system should respond to
the challenge of the Internet and information systems through the application and
development of doctrines relating to areas of property and contract.
The general themes found in these contributions relate to the effects of what we
are experiencing. This includes issues such as the impact on traditional legal
doctrines of the new power of information acquisition, data-mining, privacy invasion
and protection. A core question is who should be allowed to generate or possess
access to information about people who never authorized its collection and use. As
Radin and other contributors suggest, resolving such questions in the context of law
requires careful thinking about the application of doctrinal areas involving property,
contract, the rules of competitive behavior, and constitutional law.
Following the descriptive overview of contributors’ analyses, I offer some
thoughts about the context of what is being produced as a result of the emergence of
the Internet and associated information capabilities. This is done through a
consideration of the economic and social dynamics of the “event” we are
experiencing, one I describe as a Kondratiev Wave whereby a society undergoes a
shift in the basic nature of its economic system in ways so fundamental that the
social and political context is also transformed. Also discussed are the impacts of
information capabilities on government, business and individuals, and the role of the
judiciary in responding to the rapidly changing environment. That judicial role is
argued to be one that should seek to preserve the best qualities of the existing legal
1
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order and avoid the application of ill-considered and unnecessary doctrines to what
are seen as new contexts.
Throughout the Symposium can be found the attempt to answer key questions.
These include considering why we should care about the Internet and intellectual
property and about what is allowed to be propertized. Part of the discourse raises
concerns about where the lines should be drawn as to how economic and
governmental activities are conducted as a result of exponentially expanded
information capabilities and which behaviors should be recognized as valid or
invalid.1
I. OBSERVATIONS ON SYMPOSIUM ESSAYS
The contributions in this Symposium relate in various ways to perceived threats
to individual life produced by the greatly expanded capabilities of information
technologies. With this goes concern with how courts and legislatures are reacting to
the developments. This is a particular concern due to the widespread propertization
of data about individuals that is made possible by data-mining, spyware, and
information synthesis and interpretation software developed by the private sector and
increasingly accessible to governments and large-scale corporate actors. As ordinary
citizens realize that others have access to virtually everything they say or do and that
they are generating electronic versions of themselves through Internet usage,
consumer habits, and employer monitoring of behavior, this is likely to have a
“chilling effect” on our communication activities and other behavior.2 The

1

The debate over John Ashcroft’s proposed Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS) reveals the inexorable tendency of government to use whatever technologies are
available to achieve its ends and to unfailingly overreach for what seem to be the best of
reasons. See, e.g., Jane Black, Some TIPS for John Ashcroft: Mr. Attorney General, Forget
Your Plan For a System to Promote Americans Spying on Americans. It Won't Work—and is
Un-American, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, July 25, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/bw
daily/dnflash/jul2002/nf20020725_8083.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). The TIPS program
was intended to be initiated in ten cities as a pilot program and to enlist 1 million “informers”
to report on others’ activities. It was abandoned before it started but the capability remains.
2

Admiral John Poindexter was initially authorized to create the Information Awareness
Office in the Pentagon that mirrored much of what Ashcroft sought. The Guardian reports
that:
the IAO has begun work on a global computer surveillance network which will allow
unfettered access to personal details currently held in government and commercial
databases around the world.
Contracts worth millions of dollars have been awarded to companies to develop
technology which will enable the Pentagon to store billions of pieces of electronic
personal information—from records of internet use to travel documentation, lending
library records and bank transactions—and then access this information without a
search warrant. The system would also used video technology to identify people at a
distance. ‘Total Information Awareness,’ or TIA, was proposed to the Pentagon by
Admiral John Poindexter after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. A former
official in the Reagan administration who was convicted for his leading role in the
Iran-Contra scandal, Poindexter was appointed head of the IAO in February.
Lawrence Donegan, Pentagon Creates a Big Brother so Uncle Sam Can Keep His Eye on us,
Nov. 17, 2002, THE OBSERVER, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/ international/story/0,6903,84
1731,00.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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apprehension by citizens that there is no longer any reliable private dimension of
their lives that can be counted on to be free of surveillance will produce protective
behaviors and a distrust of governmental and economic actors.
In her essay, “A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu,”
Margaret Jane Radin presents a set of orienting themes that offer points of departure
and critique by the other contributors.3 Radin’s discourse covers the use of
metaphor, conflict between systems, and changes in the area of intellectual property
law. She observes that some judges are ignoring seemingly applicable existing legal
doctrines in this dimension. An important element of Radin’s argument is her focus
on propertization rather than property, emphasizing that the fields of intellectual
property and information propertization represent a dynamic process rather than a
fixed or established set of clear rules.
In discussing “property in the digital environment” Radin urges that analyses
need to take account of other policy considerations, including contractual ordering,
the effects of competition, and freedom of expression. It is important that Radin
includes freedom of expression as one of her policy “neighborhoods” that should be
given strong consideration as a priority value in legal decision-making. Justice
Brandeis argued that apart from the more generic social justifications of free speech,
the ideal is also intended to provide important benefits in facilitating the quality of
our individual development as persons.4 The benefits of free expression to the
overall society are based on the principle that a society comprised of free and
“developed” humans is a qualitatively richer society. This advances the idea
represented by Aristotle’s principle of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, in which a
primary function of the State was to create conditions conducive to the maximum
qualitative development of individual humans.5 The admittedly questionable
premise is that a community comprised of the most progressive individuals who are
all intent on attaining their maximum potential as humans would automatically be
the best community.
Radin approaches her explanation of propertization by offering the metaphor of
the neighborhood as a central analytical device—arguing for four “neighborhoods”
bounding each other around the doctrinal collections of property, contract,
competition and free expression. Radin suggests these policy “neighborhoods” are
important elements in determining the boundaries of propertization. She also
remarks on the existence of “grey areas” that are almost like a frontier where rules

3
Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006).
4
This is reflected in Justice Brandeis’s, concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile . . . .
5

See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, c. VII, Bk. I, for his description of eudaimonia
or the promotion of human flourishing, as being the goal of society.
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are not as clear or fixed and power and context play significant roles. Radin sees
property itself not as a static phenomenon but as a scalar process—not an either this
or that choice in which one choice necessarily excludes the other, or a zero sum
exchange in which fixed and finite allocations result in winners and losers.
Consistent with her idea of property as scalar is the argument that propertization is a
scheme of mutual cooperation and negotiation of exchanges.
Radin also posits the need to preserve incentives for those who invest in or create
information. These incentives almost certainly involve the legally recognized right
to control and benefit from the use of information. This reveals the inherent tension
between a policy of widespread access to information in a democratic society and the
ability to control access and extract rents for the use of that information. This
represents a fundamental boundary issue in the development of judicial and
legislative policy relating to access to information.
Part of Radin’s argument is that decisions about what should be propertized are
pragmatic and cannot be dealt with through the interpenetration of competing and
overlapping abstractions but require context, facts and awareness of circumstances.
This means that in determining what policies to follow, information propertization
should take explicit account of the abutting contextual “legal milieu” that bears on
the particular issues in specific situations. This legal milieu is made up of the
bundles of doctrines and rules that courts have traditionally used in analyzing related
or conceptually similar issues. She develops this theme in the interplay of
trademarks and what pejoratively became known as “cybersquatting”—a term that
once accepted as a fair characterization helps decide the issue by the negative
connotations of how the behavior is “framed”.
In the context of “cybersquatting” Radin questions courts that have developed a
doctrine that rewards trade mark holders who did not take the time at an early point
to protect their options for Internet site creation by acquiring domains. The
protection is afforded by denying those who acquired domains in anticipation of their
growing value as the Internet evolved into a sales and marketing tool the ability to
auction those sites to sellers with greater need, i.e., those with an existing market
identity who discovered that the Internet-savvy domain purchasers had beaten them
to a domain name that consumers were likely to think of when searching for products
or services. The doctrinal contrast is that speculators in land are allowed to take
advantage of developments that create demand and add value to land they purchase
in anticipation of rising demand while dot.com speculators have had a far more
difficult time.
Property and contract are inextricably connected at numerous points. One
intersection is because contract is an important means of allocating, recognizing and
enforcing the choices that have been made concerning what constitutes property.
Jane Winn and Brian Bix, in “Diverging Perpectives on Electronic Contracting in the
US and EU,” focus on two distinct systems operating according to different value
emphases.6 Their analysis discusses what interests are being protected and most
highly valued in the U.S. in contrast with the EU. This includes examining what
courts are doing in each context and how decisions on virtually identical facts will
differ in the two distinct legal cultures. A substantial part of the discussion looks at

6

Jane Winn & Brian Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S.
and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (2006).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/3

4

2006]

PROPERTIZATION, CONTRACT, COMPETITION

5

what have come to be known as “shrink wrap,” “click wrap,” “browse wrap,” and
“terms in the box” forms of judicially enforced agreements in the U.S. These are
“novel” ways of contracting that seem to offer ways of entering legally binding
transactions that have little to do with what we have traditionally thought of as
negotiated terms between bargaining parties, yet the strong tendency is for courts to
allow the behavior.
While Winn and Bix suggest there is only a rough connection between Radin’s
propertization idea and the electronic contracting rules they are critiquing, the use of
state power to enforce and allow the “novel” forms of electronic contracting is a key
element of at least part of the process of propertization. If such approaches are not
enforced in a positive law system then they are not “property.” This includes
“Rolling Contracts” in which one side to a “contract” is allowed the power to
unilaterally alter contract terms and conditions. It can be argued that clickwrap,
shrinkwrap and terms-in–the-box conditions may look like a contract but are
equivalent to bait and switch tactics that violate many state consumer laws.
Winn and Bix also discuss the distinction in EU law in which greater protection
for consumers is offered than for businesses. Like Radin, they comment on
American judges’ undesirably loose treatment of UCC requirements regarding
limitations on types of contract terms, including the need for conspicuous
presentation of terms when the contract is constructed. They argue that the judiciary
seems to be deliberately constructing rules favorable to business interests.7 In
browsewrap contexts they argue that it is questionable whether actual assent to the
terms exists. They offer an example of the conflict between traditional doctrine and
the newer approaches, concluding that contract rules have tended to not take silence
or inaction as assent or acceptance of terms but that the reverse is common with
these newer electronic contracting approaches.
George Taylor and Michael Madison, in “Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities,”
begin by recognizing that contract and property overlap.8 They commend Radin for
her important contribution of the “relational view of property” while acknowledging
and then challenging her argument that certain qualities of “personhood” should be
inalienable in the economic market. While Radin seeks to prevent the reduction of
the person to an object sundered from its essential self, relying on Hegel’s idea of
alienation, Madison and Taylor argue that objectification of the person, and
objectification of various features of the digital environment, may also have
important system benefits.
Madison and Taylor present an extended critique of Radin’s analysis, basing it in
part on Gadamer’s argument that meaning and application are interrelated and that
meaning changes with application. Central to this interplay is the speculative form
of analysis that seeks to fix meaning, contrasted with metaphorical thought that seeks
to undermine some fixed meanings and create new meanings through interpretation.
The result is that in our discourse the speculative and metaphorical forms are
conjoined in an interactive process through which new adaptations emerge, much as
in the classic Hegelian dynamic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Taking this
critique an additional step, they use examples from contemporary intellectual
7

Id. at 179-80.

8

Michael Madison & George Taylor, Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities, 54 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 141 (2006).
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property law discourse to demonstrate how an interactive approach can yield
important insights.
Kevin Collins, in “Cybertrespass and Trespass to Documents,” argues that the
Internet is not just electrons drifting in space but that it is physical in the sense of
servers and technology that contain the information and owners who control these
systems. The issues of propertization thus become ones of the rights of server
owners to “own” the information contained on those information systems in terms of
controlling others’ access, competition and use for economic or political reasons.
Collins discusses the issue of policies of the scope and extent of control that should
be accorded ownership in the context of two types of cases he defines as distribution
and extraction. In distribution cases the context is one where an Internet user seeks
to send a message through a server that is intended to arrive at a final recipient or site
and the intermediate server owner seeks to enjoin the message based on its content.
In the extraction situation a user “accesses publicly available information on a
website and a server owner . . . seeks to enjoin the user’s continued access to the
website because the user employs the information . . . in a manner that is legal yet
contrary to the server owner’s interest.”9
Collins poses the critical question as how to deal with the policy regarding
“cybertrespass.” An interesting point in the context of the use of terms such as
“cybersquatting” and “cybertrespass” is that they are not value neutral. Framing an
issue in such language generates an inchoate judgmental response that already moves
a decision maker part way to the conclusion that such behavior should be sanctioned.
He asks in our consideration of the appropriate policies and doctrines: “Who can
access, transmit and use information on the Internet and under what circumstances
can he or she do so?” 10 He admits that “classic, old-world questions of tangible
property . . . in isolation are ill suited to providing thoughtful answers in informationcentered disputes.”11
While he discusses trespass to land and chattels, Collins argues that courts have
dealt historically with a more directly analogous situation through the doctrine of
trespass to documents. He develops this analysis by looking at several recent cases.
Part of the problem with using the doctrines of trespass to land and chattels is that
they recognized only physical invasions as trespasses. It is then noted that electrons
are not “physical” and that this poses an obvious problem for the application of those
doctrines. This point is developed at some length through analysis of the Thrifty-Tel
case relating to concerns about information intangibility and trespassory invasions by
electronics.12 Part of the Thrifty-Tel analysis is the holding that “small particles”
thought intangible could be actionable invasions to land. For example, an equivalent
situation arguably exists with the doctrines of trespass to land and nuisance in the
area of environmental or toxic torts. Particulates and air pollution that could not be
measured at one point historically due to technological limits evolved doctrinally
into recognized trespasses as the ability to reliably measure the phenomena emerged.
9

Kevin Emerson Collins, Cybertrespass and Trespass to Documents, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
41, 43 (2006).
10

Id. at 42.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 46-48.
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Collins suggests this analysis transferred to the Internet context in the Thrifty-Tel
court’s use of the idea of the invasion of system infrastructure by electronic
information or data packets sent by others aimed at extracting information to which
they had no right of access. The message is that it takes time for judges to determine
how best to characterize new situations and how to adapt doctrines in ways
applicable to new contexts.
Collins also develops the argument that although the physical servers are owned,
they owe their ability to operate meaningfully and create economic value for their
owners only through being networked with the myriad of other systems that
comprise the Internet. A primary value-added component is therefore something
created by others on whom they are piggy-backing or free riding. Both as a matter of
social policy and economic legitimacy this fact of dependency and benefit created by
the larger system at a minimum offers a counter to claims of entitlement to full and
unfettered control and exclusive propertization. This shifts the analysis from a clear
property and control context of rights granted by virtue of being the owner of the
physical system to a public interest versus server owner interest conflict. Here it can
be argued that for the server owners linking to the Internet indicates an acceptance of
risk or consequences for the right to “play.”
Daniel Barnhizer, in “Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and
Control of the Self in the Information Age,” takes a more philosophical tack.13 He is
concerned with what this new system of communication and interaction does to the
person. Part of this involves the questions of how we protect the individual in the
context of invasions of privacy, data-mining, and the ability of others to access
information about individuals that creates in effect a virtual person that can be
manipulated for the users’ benefit. Such electronic doppelgangers appear to provide
producers with inordinate bargaining power over individual consumers by using
consumers’ personal information to exploit consumer needs, wants and foibles.
Included in the analysis are discussion of competitive efficiencies and the
emergence of different kinds of power relations between producers and consumers.
Although much remains the same, there are basic and important differences. One is
the ability of producers, marketers and sellers to create sophisticated databases about
consumers and specific customers. Barnhizer argues convincingly that the degree of
targeting can be frightening. But he also suggests that consumers have obtained a
heightened ability to obtain information, and to monitor sellers and producers for
quality, integrity and behavior. In light of this incredibly complex and dynamic
ability of both sides in the consumer contracting equation to manipulate and improve
their bargaining power, Barnhizer concludes that legal conceptions of bargaining
power should abandon traditional contract approaches to the phenomenon. Adapting
the metaphor of propertization to the contract law context, Barnhizer
reconceptualizes the traditional legal interpretation of bargaining power from an
intuitively perceived gestalt arising from the parties’ relationship to a series of
discrete inputs that can be developed and owned by each party and that in turn serve
as a wall or fence protecting an individual’s “property” in self, including the ability
to withhold consent.

13

Daniel Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the
Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69 (2006).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

7

8

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

Barnhizer raises concerns about the ability of marketers and purveyors of
information to create “doppelgangers” or “virtual persons” based on information we
unwittingly input to the Internet through web surfing activities, purchases and other
inquiries that we naively thought were discrete and independent acts but when
“mined” by sophisticated software systems can be brought together in ways that
allow enhanced manipulation of us without our knowledge. 14 This converts us into
objects to be targeted by sellers on levels independent of rational choice. A key
question involves not only whether such personalized data-mining should occur but,
if it does, who owns the profile. If portrayals of celebrities can be propertized to the
degree that others must pay to use the profile and can do so only with the person’s
consent, it is not an irrational leap to suggest that individual users of the Internet own
their characteristics and that others either should not collect and integrate that data
or, if they do, it can only occur with the consent of the individual user and with a
negotiated value.
Anupam Chander, in “Exporting DMCA Lockouts,” argues that U.S. hegemony
and dominance has led to efforts to control and dictate terms through the use of free
trade agreements by the U.S. to impose its rules regarding copyright and
anticircumvention provisions into free trade agreements as a condition of granting
access to US markets. He argues that our free trade agreements include “mandates
on … database protections, domain names, encrypted program-carrying satellite
signals, rights management information, and geographical indications. In effect, we
are rewriting the intellectual property laws of our trade partners.”15 Chander
maintains that in attaining this admittedly legitimate goal of protecting digital films
and music, the U.S. has “ignored the legal milieu of intellectual property, in
particular, competition law, foisting upon our trading partners rules that may be
exploited to permit corporations to gain monopolies in the after-market for their
products.”16
Abraham Drassinower, in “Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First
Possession,” explores the “relation between authorship and ownership, originality
and first possession.”17 He presents an intriguing analysis developed through a case,
Pierson v. Post, in which the key issue is one of whose interest should be protected
and at what point is one entitled to legal protection.18 Drassinower begins with a
discussion of the rights of a frustrated fox hunter whose intent to gain his quarry was
foiled at the last moment by another hunter. This device is used to raise the issue of
the point at which ownership rights manifest.
He then moves from the issue of the conditions of intention and property right
acquisition in Pierson to the essay’s basic question, one Drassinower poses as: “Just
as originality describes what a person must do in order to constitute herself as an
14
The spying and monitoring capability is quite extensive and frightening in its potential.
See, e.g., Joseph Menn, Now, Every Keystroke Can Betray You, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/latimes/20050918/ts_latimes/noweverykeystroke.
15

Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 217 (2006).

16

Id.

17

Abraham Drassinower, Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First Possession, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 191 (2006).
18

Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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author for purposes of copyright law, so does first possession describe what a person
must do in order to constitute herself as an owner for purposes of property law.”19
He explains: “I want to posit that the distinction between property and copyright
cannot be adequately grasped as a distinction between tangible and intangible subject
matter. The point of setting forth a correspondence between animus and factum in
property and idea and expression in copyright is precisely to show that an emphasis
on the intangibility of copyright subject matter is simply not sufficient to bring into
relief the specificity of copyright vis-à-vis property.”20 He continues: “My hope is to
evoke … the view that a positive theory of the public domain is impossible in the
absence of a positive theory of authorship.” 21
Frank Pasquale, in “Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility,” argues that:
“as search engines become more authoritative, encompassing more and more sources
of data, they become capable of harms commensurate with their benefits. So far
public attention has focused on privacy concerns raised by these data aggregators’
storage of all search requests connected to given users.”22 Pasquale adds that:
“Major players in the ‘creative industries’ have also claimed that search engines will
‘Napsterize’ their content or lead to a digital ‘WalMart’ capable of squeezing content
providers as effectively as the brick-and-mortar retail behemoth drives down the
prices it pays its suppliers.”23
Pasquale warns of the consequences of granting too much power over
information to the massive systems that increasingly control and have the power to
shape social and political discourse. A central point at the heart of developing policy
regarding ownership, control and ultimately propertization and contract enforcement
is that: “Search engines are not merely one more voice in a pluralistic public
dialogue, but are poised to become the chief organizer and forum for research, public
discussion, and commercial competition among internet users.”24 Echoing Radin’s
policy concerns, Pasquale warns: “Only an ongoing concern for the policy behind
freedom of expression will make that legal neighborhood an ameliorative influence
on the gated privatopia of IP law it borders.”25
Chris Sagers takes Radin's piece in this Symposium as the starting point for a
critique centered on a problem he argues runs throughout Radin's work. Sagers
defines this as the problem of the “public/private” distinction, a problem he claims
Radin has explicitly avoided.26 The difficulty in avoiding this distinction, Sagers
concludes, is that it is an important one in most or even all the subjects she has
discussed, and particularly in the technology contexts she considers in her
19

Drassinower, supra note 17, at 191.

20

Id. at 192.

21

Id.

22

Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115,
139 (2006).
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Chris Sagers, Monoism, Nominalism, and Public-Private in the Work of Margaret Jane
Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219 (2006).
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Symposium essay. Sagers argues that her failure to grapple with this problem has
left certain conceptual difficulties in her work, and he urges her to confront the
distinction. Sagers surveys Radin’s body of work to support his argument that the
distinction is implicated throughout, though often muted. He ultimately claims that
her own abiding objectives would be best served were she to take the public/private
distinction head on.
There are reasons why authors such as Radin, Collins, Daniel Barnhizer and
Pasquale focus elements of their policy analysis on the impact on individuals and our
social community of legally authorized behaviors that have been made possible for
the first time by information systems.27 One need not be a Marxist to concede that
economic systems play significant roles in defining who we are as individuals and
how our social community functions. There is an intrinsic “morality” to economic
behavior, not a morality in the value-positive common meaning of the term, but as a
set of values necessarily attendant to and generated by the dictates of that system.
That corrupted form of morality is often not a positive source of values for guiding
our true moral behavior and ordering our institutions in ways that advance those
goals.28 When such goals are placed against the reality of a controlled society in
which humans are shaped, prodded, lied to and manipulated by massive and

27
See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, China’s Secret Internet Police Target Critics With Web of
Propaganda, THE GUARDIAN [online], June 14, 2005, http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/
news/1,12597,1505988,00.html.
Watts reports: “China’s communist authorities have
intensified their campaign against the party’s biggest potential enemy - the internet - with the
recruitment of a growing army of secret web commentators, sophisticated new monitoring
software and a warning that all bloggers and bulletin board operators must register with the
government or be closed down and fined.” Id. Watts adds:
Although the existence of an internet police force—estimated at more than 30,000—
has been known for some time, attention has previously focused on their work as
censors and monitors. Countless critical comments appear on bulletin boards of major
portals such as Sohu and Sina only to be erased minutes, or sometimes just seconds,
later. In the most recent case, all postings that blamed corrupt local officials or slowmoving police for the deaths of 88 children in floods last Friday were removed almost
as soon as they appeared.
Id. See also Becky Hogge, The Great Firewall of China, ARTS & LETTERS DAILY, May 20,
2005.
28
Aristotle argued that the ideal of the highest human development was a goal for defining
who we are. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5. One scholar sums it up as:
Aristotle teaches that each man’s life has a purpose and that the function of one’s life
is to attain that purpose. He explains that the purpose of life is earthly happiness or
flourishing that can be achieved via reason and the acquisition of virtue. Articulating
an explicit and clear understanding of the end toward which a person’s life aims,
Aristotle states that each human being should use his abilities to their fullest potential
and should obtain happiness and enjoyment through the exercise of his realized
capacities. He contends that human achievements are animated by purpose and
autonomy and that people should take pride in being excellent at what they do.
According to Aristotle, human beings have a natural desire and capacity to know and
understand the truth, to pursue moral excellence, and to instantiate their ideals in the
world through action.
Edward W. Younkins, Aristotle: Ayn Rand’s Acknowledged Teacher, THE AUTONOMIST,
http://usabig. com/autonomist/articles/aristotle.html. (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
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sophisticated organizations using the most advanced technology to achieve their
ends, the yawning gap between ideal and reality becomes dismally apparent.
II. KONDRATIEV WAVES AND THE SHIFT TO A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
It may be useful to step back for a moment from the subjectivity caused by
immersion in our rapidly shifting social context and accept we are in a period of
accelerating change with profound consequences. For this I offer the insights of
Nikolai Kondratiev, a Soviet-era economist tasked by Joseph Stalin to prove through
economic analysis that the capitalist system faced inevitable and final collapse.
Interestingly for us, but unfortunately for Kondratiev who was encouraged by a
displeased Stalin to winter in Siberia for an extended period, Kondratiev proved
through his examination of the economic history of capitalism that rather than
collapsing it experienced massive transformative shifts every sixty to seventy-five
years or so, shifts that have become known as Kondratiev Waves.29
The premise of Kondratiev’s analysis is that after a lengthy period of often
chaotic change, a new form of economic and necessarily political society emerges
that is different in kind from its predecessor. Joseph Schumpeter followed
Kondratiev’s path when he concluded in relation to what he called “creativedestruction” that: “The capitalist process not only destroys its own institutional
framework but it also creates the conditions for another. Destruction may not be the
right word after all. Perhaps I should have spoken of transformation.” 30 The
Internet and associated information technologies and integrative software systems
have generated a Kondratiev Wave, and our entire social and economic order is
being altered as a result. Nor is the process of transformation complete, including
the changes in law required to accommodate, shape and facilitate the emerging
environment.
The process we are undergoing as a result of the emergence of the Internet,
communication innovations, and the revolutionary potential of data acquisition
capabilities is sufficiently different from that which it has displaced that we are left
grasping for ways to comprehend, order and control what is unfolding. A
consequence is that our policy makers, including judges and legislators, are making
up rules “on the run.” No specific interpretation can account adequately for all
aspects of what we are experiencing or even provide much more than an ephemeral
snapshot of conditions at a specific moment.31 I don’t want to suggest there have not
29

NIKOLAI D. KONDRATIEV, THE WORLD ECONOMY AND ITS CONDITION DURING AND AFTER
THE WAR (1922); Nikolai D. Kondratiev, The Long Waves in Economic Life, in ARCHIV FUR
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK (1926) (transl. 1935, REStat). Asked by Stalin to
demonstrate the inevitable “death” of capitalism, Kondratiev identified the recurrent halfcentury “long wave.” He was rewarded by Stalin with imprisonment in a Siberian prison
camp where he died.
30

JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 162 (1950).

31

In considering the necessity of basing positive law choices on some set of fundamental
“quasi-natural” principles, and the increasing difficulty of doing so, I have always appreciated
historian Daniel Boorstin’s observation that the abandonment of belief in a divine or natural
source for the laws that governed human societies uncomfortably shifted the burden of
responsible choice of fundamental values to us. He concludes:
The discovery, or even the belief that man could make his own laws, was burdensome
. . . . [N]early every man knew in his own heart the vagueness of his own knowledge
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been similar transforming events in our history or that anything is entirely new. In
fact that is Kondratiev’s point—that there are recurring, though not cyclical, periods
in which innovations and conditions coalesce to generate profound effects on
societies of a kind that change the rules of operation and create a different order of
economic and social system. The fact that other waves of change have swept
through our economic and social order and altered the form and quality of an
existing order in ways that produce a different system does nothing to deny the fact
that we are undergoing another such change at this moment.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF “CYBERHUMANS”
A theme that intrigues me, and one that I think is implicit in several of the
Symposium contributors’ concerns with the impact of the Internet and information
technologies on humans, is the degree to which the new power of information is not
only external to us as an extrinsic technology but is redefining us in social and
individual terms. In this sense I wonder if information technology (and here I intend
it broadly to include software, the Internet and all similar elements) is encompassing
and altering humans and their societies much in the way that Marshall McLuhan
remarked occurred with printing. McLuhan offered the intriguing insight that with
printing came the rise of what he called “typographical man” where the new powers
offered by Gutenberg’s technology of printing expanded human capacities consistent
with the power of widely available written discourse.32 Until that point written
information was conveyed through a very limited number of painstakingly copied
manuscripts and religious works done by clerics and scribes. Reading and writing
were abilities possessed by few, in part because there was no real purpose to the
development of those skills if they could not be put to use.
It is almost impossible for us to appreciate the revolutionary impact on people,
institutions and governments of the vastly enlarged power granted by the invention
of printing to disseminate ideas and criticisms, including anonymous attacks on those
in power, and to communicate to large numbers of people over extensive areas.
Humans were drawn toward and altered by the power of printing and the ability to
create, share and disseminate information.33 This not only altered society and
educational systems, it undermined the ability of dominant institutions to control
discourse and to remain immune from criticism. It is fascinating that the doctrines
and the uncertainty of his own wisdom about his society. Scrupulous men were
troubled to think that their society was governed by a wisdom no greater than their
own.”
DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE DECLINE OF RADICALISM 74 (1963).
32
See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING
TYPOGRAPHICAL MAN (1962).

OF

33

See, e.g., JAMES MARTIN, THE WIRED SOCIETY (1978), particularly Ch. 11, “The
Information Deluge” where Martin indicates that in 1660 there was only one scientific journal,
in 1750 ten journals, 1,000 by 1850, and 100,000 by 1950. Id. at 116. See also GENE
ROCHLIN, TRAPPED IN THE NET: THE UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF COMPUTERIZATION
(1997), where we see that while the computer is offered as a technology of freedom, it in
many ways has become one of subjugation, monitoring and dependency as employers,
marketers and others learn how to use it for their purposes with the result of increased
workloads for employees, monitoring of activity, micro-management, and invasions of privacy
through data mining and profiling.
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relating to speech suppression and punishment have to deal with the emergence of
communications technology. The judicial system of the Star Chamber was created
independent of the Common Law courts apparently in response to the heightened
capability of mass printing and the ability to spread criticism more widely than could
be done by simple rumor and word of mouth.34 We are experiencing an event
through the power of the Internet and associated information and communications
capabilities that is every bit as compelling and revolutionary as that of printing and
the emergence of “typographical man.”
I am not arguing that the transformation caused by printing was instantaneous,
only that as printing became more widespread, commercialized and available it
created radically different capabilities over time. The society into which the
technology of mass printing was first introduced was not one in which the numerous
institutions necessary to take advantage of the innovation existed. They needed to
develop over time, and as they did they produce a new form of education, ability to
disseminate speech and ideas more broadly, and the opportunity to challenge
political power. With the Internet and communication technologies the process has
been accelerated and intensified because the necessary systems were already in
place.
Although I am arguing the coup de grace is being applied through the power of
information capabilities, the table has been set for more than a generation in terms of
the grossly expanded power of corporate entities to shape our lives and impose their
will on American society by the manipulation of wants and consumer choices. I
have great admiration for various writers speaking in the 1950s and 1960s who saw
the social transformation with wonderful, if depressing, clarity. Paul Tournier
captured the essence of the cultural forces when he observed: “[people] have become
merely cogs in the machine of production, tools, functions. All that matters is what
they do, not what they think or feel. . . . [T]heir thoughts and feelings are … moulded
by propaganda, press, cinema and radio. They read the same newspaper each day,
hear the same slogans, see the same advertisements.”35

34
See Consultation Paper on the Crime of Libel, The Law Reform Commission, Dublin,
Ireland 1991, http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/volume10/lrc_65.html (last visited
Aug. 24, 2005), where it is stated that:
In 1476, Caxton set up the first printing press at Westminster and in 1488, the Star
Chamber was set up in order to monitor and suppress criticism of Church and State,
which were at that which were at that time closely interwoven. The primary libels with
which it was concerned were therefore libels of a seditious or blasphemous nature.
However, the Star Chamber also wished to suppress duelling, which was the
fashionable means of vindicating attacks upon honour or reputation, and to this end it
also punished defamatory libels i.e. libels which impugned the integrity a private
individual. In 1606, the Star Chamber held in the celebrated case of De Libellis
Famosis [(1606) 5 Co. Rep. 125a.] that it was an offence to defame the deceased
Archbishop of Canterbury. The nature of the tasks of the Star Chamber and common
law courts were therefore altogether different; while the Star Chamber was attempting
to discourage matter which either threatened state security or might cause a breach of
the peace, the common law courts were concerned with rectification of damage done
to the reputation of an individual.
35

PAUL TOURNIER, THE MEANING
Brothers 1957).
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In criticizing the effects of market-morality, Jules Henry argued that it operates
according to a different value related to what is considered appropriate and true. He
explains, for example, that: “[t]he heart of truth in pecuniary philosophy is contained
in the following three postulates: Truth is what sells. Truth is what you want people
to believe. Truth is that which is not legally false.” 36 He went on to say that one
result of market-morality is the tendency to find a substitute for true human meaning,
explaining: “The average American has learned to put in place of his inner self a
high and rising standard of living, because technological drivenness can survive as a
cultural configuration only if the drive toward a higher standard of living becomes
internalized; only if it becomes a moral law, a kind of conscience.”37
The power, shaping effects and scale of institutional structures are part of the
phenomenon that Jacques Ellul defined as technique. In two prescient works, The
Technological Society and Propaganda, Ellul warned of the transformation of social
structure and behavior through the rise of technique.38 Ellul argued we are
increasingly trapped within a “technological society” that defines and dictates the
terms of human behavior and causes a progressive loss of our humanity. What is
occurring may therefore not be “new” in the sense that it emerged solely as a
consequence of the Internet and information capabilities, but a dismal trend has been
allowed to intensify and accelerate as the information capabilities evolved and been
seized on by economic and governmental actors.
One would be either naïve or disingenuous not to accept that such a system has
effects on those who practice it or are subject to its values as objects. If that concern
is valid, then failing to understand the implications of information systems, the
consequences of the choices judges and legislators are making as to what should be
propertized, the effects of privacy invasions and similar matters including the radical
shift in contracting power allowed by non-negotiable and often hidden terms or by
unilateral alterations of the conditions of agreement based on factors entirely under
the control of one party to the “agreement” do have profound implications for the
integrity and balance of power within our political community.
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST THE MISALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY
My argument, and that of several of the contributors to this Symposium, is that
vital policy issues relate to how we protect the individual and the ideal of what we
consider the appropriate conditions of humans in community from abuses of power
by institutions that dictate the terms of our existence and undermine our ability to
pursue the ideal of the human that has guided our philosophies for several millennia.
The choices being made by judges, legislators and regulators are neither neutral, nor
should they be thought of as simple economic behavior. They are choices that
impact on the essence of society and our sense of who we are.
Choices from the array of options found in Radin’s “neighborhoods” of
propertization, contract, competition, and free expression, along with others we can
identify once we look closely at the metaphor, will be vital tools for protecting and
36

JULES HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN 51 (Vintage Books 1965).

37

Id. at 162.

38

See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); JACQUES ELLUL,
PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN’S ATTITUDES (1965).
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preserving values to which we claim to assign the highest priority. It is important in
our environment of transformative change to have that larger discourse because the
source of tyranny is not found solely in government. This is particularly important to
accept at this point because powers have been assumed by default or granted to
private sector institutions of a kind far beyond what they should possess.
How to restrict that power consistent with the wellbeing of the social community
is one of the most compelling challenges we face. Max Lerner prefaces Mill’s On
Liberty with the observation that:
The great strength of [On Liberty] … lies in its moving away from a
narrow view of human freedom as an immunity from the power of the
state. Mill takes two giant steps away from this, toward a broader view of
freedom. One step is to see that the enemies of human freedom may be
found in the attitudes of the people themselves, and that the tyranny of the
majority may be as hostile to the expression of a man’s life and
temperament as the tyranny of the state.39
Lerner adds: “Mill was a pioneer in seeing, with the growth of social egalitarianism
and mass culture, the shadow of “an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion and
practice.”40
In this context the core issue we must confront is no longer a simplistic
conception of neat domains of public or private power but power itself. Mill’s idea
of the tyranny of the majority and the state need to be expanded to add the category
of the tyranny of uncontrolled, non-transparent and unaccountable non-state
institutional actors in possession of levels of power they were never intended to
wield. The need to control the allocation of such power is particularly vital when we
consider that the emergent points of private economic power that have traditionally
been allowed to operate in a particular way because of the inherent competitive
limits, functions and cycles of their activities now possess power without
transparency. They control power without democratic accountability, and apply that
power without the balance of a comprehensive social agenda or sense of
responsibility to the political community to act as a check on their self interest.
In this context it would be wise to heed the words of Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Furman v. Georgia. He quotes from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty:
“The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their
own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically
supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human
nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power.”41
Decisions about propertization and “novel” or illusory forms of contracting are
central to our ability to control or at least mitigate the behavior of such actors.

39

MAX LERNER, ED., ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 250 (Bantam 1961).

40

Id.

41

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467 (172) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting J.S.
MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1885).
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V. THE “SURVEILLANCE ECONOMY,” NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE UNACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE ACTOR
Another important problem is the increased difficulty of drawing clear lines
between what we have thought should be separated into the spheres of economic,
political and social activity we traditionally labeled public and private. While it may
be argued that the purported distinction is more mythical than real, judges and
legislators continue to act as if the dichotomy exists.42 In a Rule of Law society
where language shapes our perception of reality, the belief that something is as
claimed creates a degree of substance even if underlying reality belies that doctrinal
belief. We continue to see the “naked” emperor as if he is fully clothed.
To the extent the division into public and private has been based not only on
specific types of functions but on a belief that certain degrees or forms of power
should only be vested in a democratic government subject to popular control, the
transfer of large-scale, pervasive and often invisible and unaccountable power to
private economic entities poses a threat to effective governance. This threat justifies
the use of strategies of control and limitation that have not traditionally been applied
to economic actors in a market-based political economy.
The tradition of the public/private distinction is particularly problematic in the
field of information acquisition and propertization. An unhealthy relationship that is
not in the interest of the citizenry has emerged between government and information
businesses. The symbiosis exists for several reasons. One is that the greatest
opportunity to profit financially from control of information as property is found in
the private sector. Another is that the private sector attracts the best talent with high
levels of innovative ability. Just as with the military-industrial complex and the oftproclaimed economic benefits of the U.S. space research program that generated new
technological breakthroughs for private sector economic actors, when government
wants and is willing to pay for a product it stimulates a host of private sector
industries.
The problem with such a powerful stimulus is that these industries become
intimately connected with government to the point they operate as surrogates in a
profitable dependency relationship even to the extent they function as unofficial
servants of governmental activity. The pressure to develop and propertize
information is in some ways driven by the government’s ability to pay for the results.
An example is found in the context of the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA
works through a global surveillance system called Echelon that has incredible power.
When it was first created almost thirty years ago Senator Frank Church warned that
it posed a fundamental threat to America’s democratic system and the relationship
between citizens and governmental control. 43
42

See, e.g., Sagers, supra note 26, at 242.

43

See the remarks of Senator Frank Church, quoted in ECHELON America's Secret Global
Surveillance Network:
[T]hat capability at any time could be turned around on the American people and no
American would have any privacy left, such [is] the capability to monitor everything:
telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide.
If this government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge in this
country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the
government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to
fight back, because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the
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As we saw with the Congressional concern about former Reagan National
Security Advisor John Poindexter’s TIA (Total Information Awareness) proposal,
the political sphere is sensitive to public concern about governmental intrusiveness. 44
But as we have also seen with the informational aspects of the Patriot Act in which
intelligence agencies seek data on citizens based on arguments of national security
needs, our officials still desire the information.45 The debate over former Attorney
General John Ashcroft’s proposed Terrorism Information and Prevention System
(TIPS) reveals the inexorable tendency of government to use whatever technologies
are available to achieve its ends and to unfailingly overreach for what seem to be the
best of reasons.46

government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the
government to know. Such is the capability of this technology . . . I don't want to see
this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make
tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that
possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that
we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.
PATRICK S. POOLE, ECHELON: AMERICA’S SECRET GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (19992000) (quoting Senator Frank Church, Meet the Press (NBC, Aug. 17, 1975)), available at
http://fly.hiwaay.net/~pspoole/echelon.html.
44

See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., The Chill from the Pentagon, CATO INSTITUTE, Nov. 25,
2002, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/crews-021125.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
Crews warns:
Government has become too large and pervasive. TIA’s commitment not to monitor
innocent individuals is not credible. There are so many compulsory cradle-to-grave
databases that the mere act of combining, sorting, sifting and interpreting them may no
longer be possible without violating our Fourth Amendment rights . . . . The
information economy and electronic commerce increasingly depend on secure and
specialized private databases, and TIA could undermine those as well. Corporate
America needs to be able to make credible privacy assurances to the public. People
need to know that the data they relinquish is confined to an agreed-upon business,
transactional or record-keeping purpose, and isn't automatically included in a
government database. If the TIA project ends up routinely requiring banks, airlines,
hotels, Internet-service providers, and other businesses to hand over such private
information, it will undermine evolving commercial-privacy standards, drive
transactions underground, and make criminals out of ordinary people who simply want
to be left alone.
Id.
45

The USA Patriot Act is an acronym representing the “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001.” For useful analysis and description, see Robin Rice, The USA Patriot Act and
American Libraries, INFO. FOR SOCIAL CHANGE, Vol. 16, Winter 2002-03, available at
http://libr.org/isc/toc.html; NYCLU, The Dangers of Expanding the Patriot Act,
http://www.nyclu.org/patriotact_sunset_pr_071205.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2005); Brigid
O’Neil, Book Review, FREEDOM DAILY, Mar. 2004; (reviewing JAMES BOVARD, TERRORISM
AND TYRANNY: TRAMPLING FREEDOM, JUSTICE, AND PEACE TO RID THE WAR OF EVIL (Palgrave
Macmillan 2003) http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0403g.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2005); Rachel
Marsden, ‘Patriot’ Dangers: To Serve and Oppress, http://www.rachelmarsden.com/columns/
patriotact.html. (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
46

See, e.g., Black, supra note 1; Donegan, supra note 2.
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The path to the actual development of deeply intrusive and pervasive information
systems and technologies lies with the private sector. This is because it has more
flexibility and better talent as well as a highly developed drive for innovation and
profit. While systems such as ECHELON may be used by governmental actors they
are developed by the private sector for use in governmental activities. The United
States’ nuclear weapons program depends on private defense contractors not only for
weapons manufacture but for management of weapons research laboratories. The
military may be the end users of other weapons systems but the weaponry is
designed and produced by private sector defense firms. These represent immensely
profitable economic activities for companies that in a technical sense are “private”,
but that are also well-compensated arms of government. The same kind of
relationship is evolving in the information context. The private sector information
systems are thus able to do what government cannot do without incurring substantial
political risk as “Big Brother.” While the process is working at one level of distance
in the U.S., in China the connection is both direct and transparently sinister, with
U.S. information giants Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft selling their democratic souls
in service to the repressive behaviors of the Chinese government.47
VI. THE STABILIZING FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIARY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING
CONTEXT
Gaining a fuller perspective and paying close attention to the implications of wise
and unwise policy choices implemented through legal doctrine and regulatory rules
is critical. As Lawrence Friedman argues: “it is through law, legal institutions, and
legal processes that customs and ideas take on a more permanent, rigid form. The

47
See the chilling example reported in Jonathan Watts, Microsoft Helps China to Censor
Bloggers, THE GUARDIAN [online], June 15, 2005. Watts describes:
Civil liberties groups have condemned an arrangement between Microsoft and
Chinese authorities to censor the internet. The American company is helping censors
remove ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ from the net in China with a software package that
prevents bloggers from using these and other politically sensitive words on their
websites. The restrictions, which also include an automated denial of ‘human rights,’
are built into MSN Spaces, a blog service launched in China last month by Shanghai
MSN Network Communications Technology, a venture in which Microsoft holds a
50% stake. Users who try to include such terms in subject lines are warned: ‘This
topic contains forbidden words. Please delete them.’ Even the most basic political
discussion is difficult because ‘communism,’ ‘socialism,’ and ‘capitalism’ are blocked
in this way, although these words can be used in the body of the main text. Many
taboo words are predictable, such as ‘Taiwanese independence,’ ‘Tibet,’ ‘Dalai
Lama,’ ‘Falun Gong,’ ‘terrorism’ and ‘massacre.’ But there are also quirks that reflect
the embryonic nature of net censorship and the propaganda ministry’s perceived
threats. The word ‘demonstration’ is taboo, but ‘protest’ is all right; ‘democracy’ is
forbidden, but ‘anarchy’ and ‘revolution’ are acceptable. On MSN Space, Chinese
bloggers cannot use the name of their own president, but can comment on Tony Blair.
‘Tiananmen’ cannot be mentioned. A Microsoft spokesman said the restrictions were
the price the company had to pay to spread the positive benefits of blogs and online
messaging.
Id. Others are apparently “paying the price” as well. See Reuters, Yahoo Accused of Helping
Jail China Internet Writer, ABC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/us/wirestory?id
=1861295.
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legal system is a structure. It has shape and form. It lasts. It is visible. It sets up
fields of force. It affects ways of thinking.”48
Francis Bacon observed several centuries ago that judicial decisions are
inherently and appropriately limited to the “immediate cause.” The reason for this,
he argued, is: “It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes, and their
impulsions one of another: therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause;
and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.” 49 The problem is
that in a fluid context such as we are now experiencing it is much too easy for judges
to wander off base in their decisions and attempt to explore what Bacon called the
infinity of the “causes of causes.”
In the vital areas where judges and legislators are making choices about what
should be propertized and made an item of exchange, and what should be denied that
authoritative characteristic due to priorities assigned other fundamental policies,
those choices determine the shape, content and texture not only of the economic
environment but of the political, social and individual cultures within which we
operate.50 Just as with the propertization of land where the owner of the bundle of
rights associated with private property is allowed to fence out others from the
specific territory or demand rents for its negotiated use, decisions to propertize
information along with its use and access fences out others from the domain and
allows the owners of the new property to negotiate rents for access and use.
Propertization of information for economic benefit generates a self-sustaining
stimulus for the further expansion of invasive information systems because allowing
48

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 257 (1984).

49

FRANCIS BACON, THE MAXIMS OF THE LAW, Regula I (1630).

50

See, e.g., Brian Bergstein, In the Data-Mining Society, Privacy Advocates Shudder: The
Internet Makes Public Information Much Easier to Access—and Exploit, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Jan. 2, 2004, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/154986_privacy
challenge02.html. Bergstein reports:
Privacy advocates say far more worrisome intrusions are due as improving technology
gives government, advertisers and insurance companies new ways to harvest precise
information. ‘We are really on the cusp of creating a surveillance society where every
action, every utterance—some might say every thought—can be traced,’ said Barry
Steinhardt, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's technology and liberty
program. The next year will bring more debate over radio-frequency identification, or
RFID, which lets stores and suppliers track inventory. Critics fear that it could
secretly monitor consumers' behavior or whereabouts; retailers say those worries are
overblown partly because RFID tags will be disabled at checkout counters.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government, acting on post-Sept. 11 mandates, will be
monitoring travel more closely. The government plans to begin scanning and storing
foreign visitors' facial images and fingerprints in 2004. It also is developing CAPPS
II—the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System—which is expected to
check travelers' credit reports, consumer transactions and other personal data. While a
privacy outcry led Congress to scale back the Pentagon's Total Information Awareness
data-mining program last year, several states are cooperating on a similar terrorism
and law-enforcement database project called Matrix, which is maintained by a private
company in Florida. Critics of such systems say they enable an unprecedented amount
of snooping on law-abiding citizens but do little to actually enhance security—
consequently creating a dangerous, false sense of safety.
Id.
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data miners to profit from such activity increases the scale, intensity and degree of
penetration of the search.
How should judges be approaching issues of propertization and “novel”
electronic contracting tactics? The nature of the Common Law is that it is a
mechanism that works in large part because it changes the internal meanings of its
doctrines slowly, carefully, and even by employing fictions and simplistic
assumptions that are taken as valid. The Common Law is not static, but it is
incremental, slow and strategic in a very muddled sense. Put the idea of the pace of
change within Common Law systems in the context of Bruce Ackerman’s remark
that: “it is most unlikely that a court will accept a novel legal argument on its initial
presentation. Most probably, such an enterprise will only serve to win somebody
else’s case ten or twenty years from now….”51 Certainly the judicial struggle to
develop new rules in the seemingly unfamiliar territory of information propertization
and novel contracting behaviors that seem to fly against the logic of precedent is
made more difficult by the muddled environment of the Internet and the capabilities
of information systems. Yet that is a reason for caution rather than bold
interventions in which judges issue proclamations without a sense of tradition, fuller
context and balance.
The language of the Common Law is open textured. Edward Levi captured the
nature of legal doctrine in his observation that: “The categories used in the legal
process must be left ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas....
[A]greement on any other basis would be impossible. In this manner the laws come
to express the ideas of the community and even when written in general terms, in
statute or constitution, are molded for the specific case.”52 Levi adds: “The law
forum is the most explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for a moving
classification system. The folklore of law may choose to ignore the imperfections in
legal reasoning, but the law forum itself has taken care of them.” 53
Judges in the kinds of cases discussed in the various contributions to this
Symposium are faced with novel questions. On one hand the matters at issue seem
to have little precedent on which judicial choices can be made, but the controversies
and claims also involve words, doctrines and concepts that still feel familiar enough
that existing doctrines can serve as guides for decision-making. The cases discussed
in the Symposium can even be thought of as landmark or determinative articulations
of novel legal doctrine that possess heightened ability to shape not only the specific
issue in the case but that can generate unknown consequences for the society itself.
David Cole has argued that: “in landmark cases … the Justices alter the puzzle
itself and create law. Thus, while judicial legitimacy requires faithful adherence to
precedent, legal development turns on creative acts.” 54 If the cases now being
decided in the realms of information propertization and electronic contracting are
novel, landmark and “hard” then we must hope that judges making these decisions
and constructing new doctrines take heed of the appropriate role of the judge and
51

Bruce Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L. J. 1131, 1139 (1981).

52

EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949).

53

Id.

54

David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95
YALE L. J. 857, 859 (1986).
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seek to apply relevant precedential analyses. We must insist that judges limit the
decision only to the concrete and necessary context, and be aware of the dangers of
making “bad law” through hard cases. The problem is that in “hard” or “landmark”
cases judges step outside their roles and seek to answer questions for which they are
ill-suited and ill-equipped.
While the aesthetic of creative acts sounds compelling and admirable, creative
acts by judges can easily be wrong or dangerous. It is also somewhat misleading to
imply that the Common Law’s faithfulness to precedent is not itself creative,
particularly given the numerous instances in which doctrine has almost mystically
changed its nature in terms of the internal meaning of the doctrine even while
managing to use the same words to characterize its purported principle. The
question is in part the nature, obviousness and pace of change. I raise this point in
light of Aristotle’s argument that our obedience to law is based more on habit and for
tradition rather than any inherent substantive characteristic of the law and that too
rapid or too frequent change in law undermines the habit of obedience.55
Within precedential structures of doctrine that have been slowly and carefully
developed and critiqued over time the incremental shifts by judges who are gradually
adjusting and even altering judicial doctrines are in an important sense tested as to
their effects. Law cases of any complexity are incompatible mixtures of fact,
rationality, values, judgment, analogy, scientific assumption, metaphysics, and
doctrinal principle.56 When judges wander from reasonably close adherence to
working precedent they are in a political and philosophical wasteland. It is fair to
ask in the context of the judicial interpretations noted throughout the contributions to
this Symposium whether some courts have altered the appropriate role with which
they are charged and rendered decisions that may be within their power but outside
their responsibility and range of wisdom.
Decisions as to propertization are precisely ones that transfer the force of law to
new conditions. Here they are conditions that have been imperfectly considered, and
reflect decisions that create a kind of “gravity well” that pulls us into its ambit and
distorts the social space we inhabit for good or ill. Doctrine is not a universe of
idiosyncratic episodes with disparate pieces. As Radin indicates, doctrinal choices
represent a system of decisions by which a political community is defined,
integrated, and regulated. Power is created and distributed and consequences are
applied through the choices. Legal doctrine is a mechanism for achieving
distributional goals and all doctrines are chosen, implicitly or explicitly, to achieve
ends.57 Because it is goal-oriented, judicial doctrine is not neutral. Judges, operating
within the rules of choice articulated for a powerful institution with critical functions,
make important choices about values.
55
Aristotle suggests why legal doctrine should not be altered too rapidly in his warning
that: “the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be
given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the
law.” ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Bk. II, ch. 8 (W.D. Ross ed., Clarendon 1957).
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The questions being asked in this Symposium include what are the wisest
choices, on what policies and values should they be grounded, what effects do the
choices have on our political order, and what mechanisms, laws and doctrines are
needed to protect the community and individuals against the power granted
government and business by the Internet and associated capabilities? Decisions
about propertization, privacy, contract and competition policy are at the heart of the
choices.
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